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The Prior Convictions Exception—A 
Comment 
Matthew Engle 
Ms. Sawyer makes a compelling case that prior convictions 
should continue to be treated differently than other facts that 
affect the duration of a criminal sentence and therefore must be 
treated as elements in a criminal prosecution.1 As she correctly 
notes, many judges and prosecutors have argued in favor of 
upholding the Almendarez-Torres exception2 because requiring 
the prosecution to prove past convictions to the jury could create 
prejudice against a recidivist defendant.3 Some skepticism is 
merited when the government seeks to lighten its own burden out 
of supposed concern for the welfare of those defendants whose 
foolhardy reluctance to waive their constitutional rights might 
prejudice them. Equally dubious are government protestations 
that the criminal justice system will grind to a halt if sentencing 
juries are required to protect the rights of criminal defendants.4 
Nevertheless, one can support the rule of Almendarez-Torres 
without suspending disbelief about the benevolent nature of 
                                                                                                     
  Visiting Professor of Law at Washington and Lee University and 
Director of the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse. 
 1. See Meg E. Sawyer, The Prior Convictions Exception: Examining the 
Continuing Viability of Almendarez-Torres Under Alleyne, 72 WASH. & LEE. L. 
REV. 409, 413 (2015) (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court should not overturn 
the prior convictions exception of the Sixth Amendment). 
 2. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226–27 (1998) 
(finding that sentence-enhancing factor based on a prior conviction is a penalty 
provision rather than a separate crime).   
 3. See, e.g., Sawyer, supra note 1, at 455 (“Herein lies one of the 
inescapable criticisms surrounding habitual-offender systems and consequently, 
one of the primary reasons to uphold Almendarez-Torres—prejudice to the 
defendant.”); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 38 (2005) (“[T]oday’s hint at 
extending the Apprendi rule to the issue of . . . prior crimes surely will do no 
favors for future defendants . . . .”). 
 4. Cf. Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. 
REV. 1467, 1491–96 (2001) (noting how many state legislatures have redrafted 
criminal statutes in light of Apprendi to reduce the burdens imposed on 
prosecutors). 
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prosecutors or the fragility of a justice system that will crumble 
under its own weight if the tiny fraction of prosecutions that 
actually go to trial are bifurcated into merits and sentencing 
phases.5 The fact remains that prior convictions are 
fundamentally different than other “sentencing factors” that the 
Apprendi revolution has recast as elements of greater offenses.6 
Unlike other facts, a prior conviction reflects a determination by 
the criminal justice system that we have arrived at the truth of a 
matter through adversarial testing. We imbue criminal 
convictions with finality because we can be confident, absent 
proof to the contrary, that we arrived at the conclusion that the 
defendant was guilty of the prior crime despite affording him all 
of the constitutional safeguards to which he was entitled. In other 
words, it is unnecessary to require a jury to find a prior 
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt because either another jury 
has already done so or the defendant has waived his right to a 
jury determination of his guilt.7 
Indeed, it would make little sense to invite subsequent juries 
to revisit the judicially determined fact of the defendant’s guilt. It 
is not difficult to imagine the problems that might arise if the 
prosecution was required to reprove the defendant’s guilt of 
crimes of which he had already been convicted whenever it 
wished to enhance a subsequent sentence.8 What would be the 
effect of a second jury’s determination that the defendant was not 
guilty for a crime of which he had previously been convicted? 
                                                                                                     
 5. It is worth noting that, in the death penalty context, bifurcated and 
even trifurcated trials have become the norm. See, e.g., United States v. Umaña, 
750 F.3d 320, 333 (4th Cir. 2014) (discussing North Carolina courts’ trifurcated 
death penalty process). These procedural safeguards do not seem to have caused 
any massive disruption in the federal government’s efforts to obtain death 
sentences. 
 6. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the 
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 7. See Garrus v. Sec’y of Pa. Dept. of Corr., 694 F.3d 394, 400 (3d Cir. 
2012) (stating that a prior conviction has already been established through 
procedural safeguards, such as fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial 
guarantees). 
 8. See Sawyer, supra note 1, at 455–56 (discussing two troublesome 
options prosecutors would face if required to prove prior convictions beyond a 
reasonable doubt).  
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Would a second jury’s determination of innocence foreclose the 
government from relying on that same conviction to enhance the 
penalty in a later prosecution? There is no compelling reason to 
invite these questions when the prosecution has already been 
held to its burden of establishing the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt in an earlier proceeding.9 
From the defense perspective, the problem with Almendarez-
Torres arises because the government is rarely satisfied to do 
what the prior convictions exception permits it to do. That is, the 
government is almost never content to prove “the fact of a prior 
conviction.” In cases where recidivism is at issue, what the 
government actually wants to do is provide the sentencer with 
prejudicial facts regarding the defendant’s alleged conduct in 
committing the prior crime. But to do so, the government 
frequently must prove facts beyond the judicially determined fact 
that the defendant was previously convicted of a particular crime.  
For example, in Shepard v. United States,10 the government 
sought to enhance the defendant’s sentence under the Armed 
Career Criminal Act (ACCA),11 which mandates a fifteen-year 
minimum sentence for anyone possessing a firearm after three 
convictions of violent felonies.12 At issue in Shepard was whether 
the defendant’s previous burglary convictions in Massachusetts, 
entered upon guilty pleas, constituted violent felonies.13 The 
Court had previously concluded that only burglaries into 
buildings or structures (as opposed to vehicles) constituted 
violent felonies within the meaning of the ACCA.14 But because 
Massachusetts permitted burglary convictions for unauthorized 
entries into buildings, structures, or vehicles, it was not clear 
                                                                                                     
 9. See Rangel-Reyes v. United States, 547 U.S. 1201, 1201 (2006) (arguing 
that judicial determination of a defendant’s prior criminal history “will seldom 
create any significant risk of prejudice to the accused”). 
 10. 544 U.S. 13 (2005). 
 11. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 15–16 (noting that the ACCA makes burglary 
a violent felony only if committed in a building or enclosed space). 
 14. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990) (“[A] person has 
been convicted of burglary for purposes of a § 924(e) enhancement if he is 
convicted of any crime . . . having the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged 
entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a 
crime.”). 
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whether the defendant’s prior burglaries qualified.15 Accordingly, 
the government argued that the Court should consider police 
reports related to the prior charges, which allegedly would have 
shown that the defendant did feloniously enter a building or 
structure.16  
The Shepard Court rightly rejected this approach, noting 
that permitting proof of facts at the subsequent trial beyond 
those that necessarily must have been found to obtain the prior 
conviction would violate congressional intent and, arguably, the 
Sixth Amendment.17 In so holding, the Court relied heavily on its 
earlier decision in Taylor v. United States,18 where it had held 
that the government was limited to introducing “conclusive 
records made or used in adjudicating guilt,” including the 
charging documents and other “recorded judicial acts of the 
court,” such as jury instructions that required specific factual 
findings to convict.19 But the Court did not stop there. In a case 
such as Shepard, involving prior guilty pleas, the Court opined 
that these “conclusive records” could also include a transcript of 
the prior plea colloquy containing a statement of the factual basis 
for the charge.20 Thus, while correctly rejecting the government’s 
attempt to rely on hearsay police reports, the Shepard Court, in 
dicta, appears to have expanded the universe of records on which 
the government may rely to establish the facts of prior offenses.21  
                                                                                                     
 15. See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16 (noting that states often define burglary 
more broadly than does the ACCA). 
 16. Id. at 17.  
 17. Id. at 19–23. 
 18. 495 U.S. 575 (1990). 
 19. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 20–21 (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602).   
 20. See id. at 16 (holding that prosecution may not rely on police reports to 
establish that a burglary was a violent felony under the ACCA). 
 21. Other courts have similarly permitted sentencing courts to consider 
plea colloquy transcripts and other documents to determine the facts of prior 
offenses. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 91 F.3d 114, 116 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(permitting the district court to consider presentence reports to ascertain the 
facts underlying the defendant’s prior guilty pleas in state court); United States 
v. Kaplansky, 42 F.3d 320, 322 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (statutory elements of 
the crime); United States v. Harris, 964 F.2d 1234, 1236 (1st Cir. 1992) 
(presentence reports); United States v. Strahl, 958 F.2d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 
1992) (statutory definitions); United States v. Garza, 921 F.2d 59, 61 (5th Cir. 
1991) (indictments), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 825 (1991); United States v. Taylor, 
932 F.2d 703, 708 (8th Cir. 1991) (statutory elements of the crime), cert. denied, 
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It is difficult to reconcile this expansion with the Apprendi 
line of Sixth Amendment holdings.22 While upholding 
Almendarez-Torres for the reasons given by Ms. Sawyer, the 
Court should nevertheless resist the government’s efforts to 
expand that decision to include additional facts beyond the mere 
fact of a prior conviction. In seeking to enhance sentences based 
on prior convictions under the Almendarez-Torres exception, the 
government should be limited to the record of conviction and 
statutory elements of the offense.23 In particular, the Court 
should reject the so-called “pragmatic” approach of permitting the 
government to prove to a judge the facts of a prior crime to which 
the defendant has pled guilty when those facts have never been 
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or even been subjected 
to confrontation by the defendant. Because the overwhelming 
number of criminal prosecutions are resolved by guilty pleas, 
inviting the government to end-run the Sixth Amendment in such 
cases would create a far more burdensome problem than the 
implementation of sentencing juries if even a small fraction of 
defendants who would otherwise plead guilty would insist on 
going to trial. At the very least, fairness would require giving the 
defendant who wished to enter a guilty plea the opportunity to 
contest the government’s proffer of the factual basis of the charge. 
In United States v. Santiago,24 another expansive view of the 
Almendarez-Torres exception was espoused by then-Judge of the 
Second Circuit Sonia Sotomayor. At issue in Santiago was 
whether the defendant’s three prior convictions had occurred on 
different occasions, such that they could be considered separate 
offenses for purposes of applying the mandatory minimum 
                                                                                                     
502 U.S. 882 (1991); United States v. Sweeten, 933 F.2d 765, 769–71 (9th Cir. 
1991) (statutory definitions); United States v. Gallman, 907 F.2d 639, 645 n.7 
(7th Cir. 1990) (jury instructions), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 908 (1991). 
 22. Indeed, concurring in the Shepard judgment, Justice Thomas urged the 
Court to seize the next opportunity to overrule Almendarez-Torres. Shepard v. 
United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26–28 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 23. See, e.g., United States v. Maness, 23 F.3d 1006, 1010 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(Ryan, J., concurring) (stating that it is “inappropriate . . . to look to the facts 
underlying the defendant’s prior burglary convictions in order to decide whether 
those crimes are violent felonies for the purpose of enhancing the defendant’s 
sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act”). 
 24. 268 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2001).  
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sentence codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012).25 In Judge 
Sotomayor’s view, the prior convictions exception permitted the 
sentencing judge to make “many subsidiary findings, not the least 
of which is that the defendant being sentenced is the same 
defendant who was previously convicted.”26 Accordingly, Judge 
Sotomayor read Apprendi as leaving to the sentencing judge not 
only the task of finding the mere fact of prior convictions but also 
“other related issues,” including the “who, what, when, and 
where” of the prior conviction.27 Thus, while declining to state 
whether the Almendarez-Torres exception applied to all issues 
related to recidivism, Judge Sotomayor held that the 
separateness of the prior offenses was merely a sentencing factor 
that could be determined by the court rather than a jury. 
The Supreme Court should reject the premise of Santiago. In 
that case, the Second Circuit reasoned that, because a sentencing 
judge would routinely be required to make “many subsidiary 
findings” regarding a prior conviction, the Almendarez-Torres 
exception should be applied broadly.28 But despite this assertion 
of “many subsidiary findings,” the Santiago court provided only a 
single example: that the subsequent sentencing court would be 
required to find that the defendant was the same person who had 
actually been convicted in the earlier prosecution.29 But this 
cannot seriously be called a “subsidiary fact;” if the Almendarez-
Torres exception means anything, surely it means that any fact, 
other than the fact of a prior conviction of this defendant, must be 
proven to a jury. It requires quite an analytical leap to conclude 
that, because the language “the fact of a prior conviction” 
includes a finding that this was the defendant who was 
previously convicted, it must also permit judicial determination of 
the “who, what, when, and where” of the prior conviction. 
Furthermore, the Santiago court made no effort to explain why, if 
the identity of the defendant as the former convict was contested, 
the state should not be required to convince a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt of this rather significant fact. 
                                                                                                     
 25. Id. at 152. 
 26. Id. at 156. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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Fortunately, as the rule of Apprendi has been reinforced by 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions, the Santiago view—that all 
facts related to recidivism may be shoe-horned into the 
Almendarez-Torres exception—has been increasingly rejected. 
Sitting en banc, the Third Circuit recently granted a habeas 
petition and found Pennsylvania’s application of its own three-
strikes law to be an unreasonable application of Apprendi. In 
Garrus v. Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections,30 
the habeas petitioner challenged a judicial determination that his 
prior offense had involved burglarizing an occupied building 
when in fact he had pled guilty to second-degree burglary, an 
offense that under Pennsylvania law necessarily involved 
burglarizing an unoccupied building.31 In concluding that the 
defendant had actually entered an occupied building, the 
sentencing court had relied on police reports and a victim’s 
statement.32 Granting the habeas petition and vacating the 
enhanced sentence, the Third Circuit stated that the prior crimes 
exception “is not a panacea allowing recidivism-related judicial 
fact-finding,” and recognized Almendarez-Torres as a “‘limited’ 
and ‘narrow’ exception to the Apprendi rule,” which rests at least 
partially on the procedural safeguards that had already attached 
to the fact of the prior conviction, including fair notice of the 
allegations, the right to a jury trial, and the beyond reasonable 
doubt standard.33 
Ms. Sawyer’s Note urges the Court to confirm the viability of 
the Almendarez-Torres exception, and I agree with this position. 
However, the Court should also clarify that the prior crimes 
exception neither swallows the rule nor opens the door to judicial 
fact-finding of any recidivism-related issues. If the prosecution 
wishes to allege facts regarding prior convictions that go beyond 
the actual fact of conviction and the statutory elements that were 
necessarily established to obtain that conviction, then those 
additional facts should be treated as elements. The government 
must provide notice of those allegations and prove them to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
                                                                                                     
 30. 694 F.3d 394 (2d Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 31. Id. at 396. 
 32. See id. at 398 (discussing the decision of the sentencing court). 
 33. Id. at 406. 
